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Cambridge quantum network
J. F. Dynes1*, A. Wonfor2, W. W. -S. Tam1, A. W. Sharpe 1, R. Takahashi3, M. Lucamarini 1, A. Plews1, Z. L. Yuan 1, A. R. Dixon 3,
J. Cho4, Y. Tanizawa3, J. -P. Elbers4, H. Greißer4, I. H. White2, R. V. Penty2 and A. J. Shields1
Future-prooﬁng current ﬁbre networks with quantum key distribution (QKD) is an attractive approach to combat the ever growing
breaches of data theft. To succeed, this approach must offer broadband transport of quantum keys, efﬁcient quantum key delivery
and seamless user interaction, all within the existing ﬁbre network. However, quantum networks to date either require dark ﬁbres
and/or offer bit rates inadequate for serving a large number of users. Here we report a city wide high-speed metropolitan QKD
network—the Cambridge quantum network—operating on ﬁbres already populated with high-bandwidth data trafﬁc. We
implement a robust key delivery layer to demonstrate essential network operation, as well as enabling encryption of 100 Gigabit
per second (Gbps) simultaneous data trafﬁc with rapidly refreshed quantum keys. Network resilience against link disruption is
supported by high-QKD link rates and network link redundancy. We reveal that such a metropolitan network can support tens of
thousands of users with key rates in excess of 1 kilobit per second (kbps) per user. Our result hence demonstrates a clear path for
implementing quantum security in metropolitan ﬁbre networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Reliably securing current network infrastructure has never been a
more pressing issue. Accounts of breaches in personal and
corporate data are frequently reported and the fall-out can be
extremely damaging and costly to the parties involved.1,2
Strengthening the security of networks that transport sensitive
data is therefore of paramount importance to mitigating the
threat of data theft. Securing network data channels through the
use of quantum cryptography3,4 is a robust method of safe-
guarding data communications—the security of which derives
from the laws of quantum mechanics. However, this security
comes at a price: quantum states must in general be used to
transport information and these carriers are extremely fragile.
Consequently previous approaches at building quantum networks
have allocated additional dark ﬁbres for quantum communication,
distinct from the ﬁbres carrying conventional data trafﬁc.5–9
The simplest conﬁguration of a quantum network consists of
three geographically separated nodes, which are linked by
quantum channels.10 This differs from simple point-to-point links
consisting of only two nodes. It is also understood that a quantum
network also includes all the functional layers required in a real
network such as key delivery and application layers. Ideally the
approach to building quantum networks should not adopt
dedicated resources. Rather for quantum networks to become a
mainstay in commercial networks, it must be implemented as an
upgrade to existing network infrastructures.
Progress has been made starting with point-to-point quantum
key distribution (QKD) experiments multiplexing classical data
onto a single ﬁbre in the laboratory11–19 evolving to moderate
speed point-to-point QKD link multiplexing demonstrations in the
ﬁeld with secure bit rates in the range of tens of kbps20 or a factor
of ten greater.21 At the same time the classical data intensities
have been increased to as much as +20 dBm in a very impressive
multiplexed point-to-point QKD ﬁeld trial.20 Multiplexed quantum
networks have been demonstrated both in the laboratory22,23 and
the ﬁeld24–28 but secure bit rates are low; generally on the order of
1 kbps. Furthermore, although these quantum networks employ
quantum and classical trafﬁc multiplexing, it is unclear whether
these networks can coexist with high ≥100 Gbps third-party data
bandwidths. Finally, support for classical data quantum encryption
has been limited to low-bandwidth applications such as telephone
one-time-pad encryption.28 There is therefore an urgent need for
demonstrating the feasibility of concomitant high-speed Mbps
quantum encryption in single ﬁbre real-world quantum networks.
Table 1 gives a comparison of some of the state-of-the-art
quantum links and networks.
Metropolitan networks inhabit a critical region in the overall
three layer network model.29 They bridge the gap between the
access network and the core or backbone network and for legacy
reasons are mostly based on ﬁbre ring topologies.30 Meshing of
such a ring permits all nodes to communicate, as well as link
redundancy in the event of partial network failure. To preserve
these important features in a quantum network, QKD has to offer
high bit rates, as explained below. Consider for example the ring
network with N= 5 nodes A–E in Fig. 1(a). All nodes are logically
interconnected by arranging the intermediate nodes to act as
relays. An example relay is shown between node A and node C via
the relay node B. In this way, although the network is still
physically a ring, it is topologically fully meshed. Of course to
adequately support the network with a minimum bandwidth per
logical link, B, the QKD links themselves must supply a minimum
key rate, R. As the number of nodes in the ring, N, grows, the
minimum bandwidth (or bit rate) per logical link decreases
quadratically (see Methods) as
B  4R= NðN  1Þ½  (1)
For only N= 10 nodes and a QKD link key rate of R= 1.5 kbps
found in a typical network ﬁeld trial,9 the bandwidth (or bit rate)
per logical link drops to B < 100 bps. In all, 100 bps can be
considered a practical lower limit for most user applications.16 On
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the other hand, QKD link key rates of R= 2.5 Mbps or greater can
support individual logical links with practical rates of 100 kbps or
greater. Even in a large city, which may feature a metropolitan ring
the user bandwidth is still a serviceable, 1 kbps.
The example above described a ring network built with point-
to-point QKD links. An alternative approach using point-to-point
QKD for building quantum networks could be Measurement
Device Independent QKD (MDI-QKD). This offers a linear improve-
ment in the scaling in the number of links versus the number of
nodes, as well as a relaxation in the security of the single photon
detectors.31 However, the rates are typically low: of the order of
tens of bps for a recent three node quantum network ﬁeld trial.32
We remark there is promise of MDI-QKD becoming a practical
reality with recent laboratory experiments33 and also on asym-
metric MDI-QKD displaying kbps secure bit rates.34
In the context of wavelength multiplexing quantum signals with
classical signals, continuous variable (CV) QKD16,17 can be utilised
instead of its discrete variable (DV) QKD counterpart. CV-QKD has
an intrinsically high tolerance to noise from Raman scattering, due
to homodyne detection acting like a ﬁlter and thus can endure
high-classical laser launch powers.35 Nevertheless, DV-QKD has
been proven to operate in the presence of up to +5 dBm launch
powers18 and up to +20 dBm when the quantum channel is
moved to O-band.20 Furthermore, the full security of the DV-QKD
protocol adopted in this paper has been well established for a
number of years, even in the ﬁnite-size scenario.36
In this work, we present a three node high-speed quantum
metropolitan ring network based in the city of Cambridge, UK. The
Cambridge quantum network is depicted in Fig. 1(c) and forms a
portion of a wider UK quantum network stretching from
Cambridge to Bristol via London, which is part of the UK Quantum
Communications Hub. It is composed of three underground ﬁbres
connecting sites in the north-east of the city (TREL, premises of
Toshiba Research Europe Limited) with the south (ENGI, Depart-
ment of Engineering, University of Cambridge) and the west
(CAPE, Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics). Fibre
distances (losses) are 10.6 km (3.9 dB) [CAPE – TREL], 9.8 km
(4.2 dB) [TREL – ENGI] and 5.0 km (~2.5 dB) [ENGI – CAPE]. The
average ﬁbre loss coefﬁcient across all three links was 0.43 dB/km,
which is very similar to a dark ﬁbre three-link quantum network
previously demonstrated.9 To satisfy the requirements of a
practical level of bandwidth for users explored above, the building
blocks of this network are state of the art single ﬁbre QKD systems
with secure bit rates exceeding 3 Mbps over short distances. A
similar design has been successfully demonstrated in the
laboratory,37 but never in the ﬁeld or in a quantum network. We
remark that an extremely high speed, 10 Mbps, QKD system has
been recently reported, but it utilised a dark ﬁbre for the quantum
channel.38 A network key delivery layer39 is used to serve keys to
applications in the Cambridge quantum network, as well as
performing key relaying functions.40 We demonstrate a 200 Gbps
encrypted link operating over the same ﬁbre as QKD, which
simultaneously consumes QKD keys for high-speed Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption. Uninterrupted application
key consumption is observed when keys are re-routed via
different network paths.
Results
We ﬁrst built, installed and evaluated the quantum layer in the
network, Fig. 2(a). Three single ﬁbre GHz clocked QKD systems
were constructed. These systems run an efﬁcient version of the
phase encoded DV-QKD BB84 protocol with decoy states41 and
ﬁnite sample sizes.42 The quantum channels of all systems operate
on the International Telecommunication Union Dense Wavelength
Division Multiplexing (DWDM) 100 GHz C-band grid43 at wave-
lengths around 1550 nm and are multiplexed with the classical
QKD reconciliation channels using standard wavelength spacing.T
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A portion of the DWDM C-band spanning sixteen 100 GHz
channels (1528 nm–1540 nm) is reserved for multiplexing in
application trafﬁc; an example of which is discussed below. The
QKD systems are fully autonomous, featuring automatic initialisa-
tion and automatic feedback for photon temporal, polarisation,
and phase drift.44 Room temperature operation of the single
photon detectors in the QKD systems’ receivers improves system
reliability due to the absence of detector cooling.45 All these
attributes are essential for ease of network deployment and
maintenance.
Figure 2(b) shows the performance of the quantum layer over a
period of 580 days or ~1.6 years. All three links exhibited secure
J.F. Dynes et al.
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bit rates of >2 Mbps during this period, including outages. These
outages were due to a number of factors including uninterrup-
table power supply (UPS) failure as well as power supply outages,
which lasted longer than the UPS batteries could support. We also
executed several software and hardware updates, which inter-
rupted network operation. Normally, the outages would range
from a few hours to a few days (if it had happened over a
weekend for example). The probability of power supply related
outages could be reduced by using UPSs with longer battery
lifetimes.
The CAPE-TREL link achieved an average secure bit rate of
2.58 Mbps with a corresponding 129 Terabit (Tbit) of key material
distilled. The TREL-ENGI link displayed a slightly lower average
secure bit rate, including outages of 2.40 Mbps and a resultant
total of 120 Tbit of key material created over the 580-day period.
The ﬁnal link, CAPE-ENGI resulted in the lowest amount of key
material distilled in the network (111 Tbit) with a concomitant
average secure bit rate of 2.22 Mbps. As the losses of all three links
in the network were very similar, the average secure bit rates for
all three links are much alike.
These long-term results from the Cambridge metro network
quantum layer can be favourably compared with the closest long-
term network demonstration; namely the SwissQuantum network.9
This network was composed of three metropolitan length links and
ran over ~2 years but with comparatively low secure bit rates of
kbps despite employing dark ﬁbres for the quantum trafﬁc. In the
SwissQuantum network the total secure bits distilled was around
0.13 Tbits for the best performing link. Instead the Cambridge
quantum network’s best performing link produced 129 Tbits of key
material, so approximately three orders of magnitude larger. The
aggregate secure key material of all three links was 360 Tbits. This
constitutes the highest amount of key material ever distilled in a
quantum network by a signiﬁcant margin.
Having demonstrated the quantum layer, we move up a layer
into the network key delivery layer. We note network key
management for QKD has been developed by Peev et al.,6 Sasaki
et al.,8 and Stucki et al.9 However, for this study we adopt a recent
design by Tanizawa et al.,39,40 which features signiﬁcant beneﬁts
over other network key management architectures, in particular
high speed, Mbps operation compatible with our network
bandwidth. Figure 3(a) shows the basic idea of the network key
delivery layer. Each node is assumed to be trusted and can
generate a buffer of “global keys”, which are shared with peer
nodes using one-time-pad (OTP) tunnels encrypted by QKD keys.
In this way, the global keys are quantum secure and can be used
by applications through a dedicated application interface (API)
based on representational state transfer (REST).39 As an example
application we used two pairs of ADVA 100G classical encryption
line cards installed in two ADVA FSP3000 shelves, Fig. 4(a), which
operate over the CAPE-TREL link. Owing to the bi-directional
nature of the line cards, each card has an AES encryptor for one
direction and an AES decryptor for the opposite direction. Each
pair of line cards requests global keys from their local node
approximately every 4 s, i.e.: the QKD link supplies global keys on
average every 2 s (since there are two pairs of line cards). The
global keys replace the regular AES key used to normally encrypt
the 100G data trafﬁc. We point out that the key refresh rate of 1
global key every 4 s corresponds to a (global) bit rate of ~100 bps.
The current key exchange frequency is not limited by the AES
hardware, but rather due to the speed of the REST API that hands
over each key individually from the QKD device to the AES engine.
A speed-up could be achieved, e.g., by transferring multiple keys
and by optimising the runtime of the protocol. Note a standard C-
band transmission system design allows for a fully loaded system
to work by collecting QKD keys in parallel without any further
changes.
Now we describe the network key delivery layer in action. For
clarity we restrict the results reported here to a single 24 h period,
Fig. 3(b), although we emphasise the network key delivery layer
has been successfully tested in the network over many months. A
zoomed 3 h section of the overall 24 h period is also shown in Fig.
3(b). When the network key delivery layer is initialised three sets of
Fig. 1 Metropolitan network topologies. a A ﬁve node ring topology, which is logically fully meshed. Five QKD links are connected in a ring
(salmon lines) supporting ten logical network connections (grey dashed lines) between all nodes. The QKD links are assumed to have similar
secure bit rates R. To realise the fully meshed network, nodes act as intermediary key relays as well as end points. An example relay is shown
between node A and node C via the relay node B. The salmon arrows represent the QKD links A–B /B–C and the grey arrow represents the
logical link that utilises the QKD links A–B/ B–C. b The bandwidth per logical link as a function of the number of nodes in a fully meshed ring
network for R= 1.5 kbps (orange), and 2.5 Mbps (wine) using Eq. (1) in the main text. c A three node ring network in the Cambridge
metropolitan area. Three nodes denoted CAPE, TREL, and ENGI are connected in a triangular arrangement using underground single mode
optical ﬁbres. Map credits: Imagery ©2017 Google, Infoterra Ltd+ Bluesky, Getmapping plc, The GeoInformation Group, Map data ©2017
Google United Kingdom. d Cambridge quantum network with up to 3n users attached to metro nodes via quantum access networks (QANs).
e The total number of users, 3n that can be supported as a function of bandwidth per user link for the topology depicted in d for QKD link
speeds of 1.5 kbps (orange line) and 2.5 Mbps (wine line)
Fig. 2 Cambridge quantum metro network— quantum layer. a Layout of the quantum layer which uses three, high-speed GHz clocked QKD
systems connecting three geographically separated nodes as depicted in Fig. 1(c). Each QKD link produces a set of QKD keys identiﬁed by the
link colour; b Quantum layer QBER, secure bit rate and total key material distilled for all three links over 580 days of operation. Blue data:
CAPE-TREL, Red data: TREL-ENGI, Green data ENGI-CAPE. The blue arrow shows the duration of the 200G trafﬁc being injected over the
CAPE-TREL link
J.F. Dynes et al.
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1000 global keys are distributed throughout the network. This
consumes ~180 kbytes of QKD keys as evidenced by the initial
increase in OTP trafﬁc for all three links. Shortly after, the 100G
application starts consuming global keys, which gradually reduces
the global keystore on the CAPE-TREL link. When the global keys
consumed reaches a threshold of 800 keys the network key
delivery layer reacts and refreshes the global key stores to their
starting value. This consumes further QKD keys from the CAPE-
TREL link (Fig. 3(b), section (i), blue line) and results in OTP trafﬁc
activity. A step-like behaviour in the OTP trafﬁc for the CAPE-TREL
link is observed, each step corresponding to refreshment of the
global key stores. Note the other two links do not show any OTP
trafﬁc activity since the key stores for those links are unaffected.
An important aspect of the network key delivery layer is
resilience to network outages,40 which we validate now. Imagine
there is a problem with the CAPE-TREL link, for example perhaps
the QKD link has failed for some reason due to an assailant
attacking this link. Automatically the network layer can react and
relay keys the opposite way around the Cambridge quantum
network, i.e.: via TREL-ENGI-CAPE. We simulated this by discon-
necting the CAPE-TREL OTP link as evident by the increasing one-
time-pad tunnel activity on the TREL-ENGI and ENGI-CAPE links,
Fig. 3(b), section (ii) (red/green lines). Note the original CAPE-TREL
(blue link’s) OTP activity has stopped since that link is no longer
used. This demonstrates resilience of the network —applications
can still keep making successful key requests; even if one of the
QKD links in the network goes down. If the original CAPE-TREL
Fig. 3 Cambridge quantum metro network—network key delivery layer. a Layout of the network key delivery layer depicting the one-time-
pad (OTP) tunnels securing global keys by consuming quantum keys from the quantum layer, as described in Fig. 2(a). b Network key relay
results: An application, which is a 100G encrypted link between TREL-CAPE, consumes global keys from the TREL-CAPE global keystore
(orange line). When the keystore is depleted to a level of 800 keys, the keystore is replenished to 1000 keys by OTP quantum encryption, as
shown by the TREL-CAPE OTP trafﬁc activity in bytes(blue line, section (i)). Initiating a link outage for the TREL-CAPE link causes the TREL-ENGI
and ENGI-CAPE links to automatically route OTP trafﬁc (green/red lines) thus maintaining network operation, section (ii). Note the green line
has been offset for clarity. Restoring the original TREL-CAPE link causes the OTP trafﬁc to be automatically directed back along the TREL-CAPE
link, section (iii)
Fig. 4 Cambridge quantum metro network—application layer. a Layout of the application layer depicting two 100G links which share the
same forward ﬁbre as the TREL-CAPE QKD link. Encryptor images credit: Dynes et al.37 b 100G pre-FEC error probability (grey line), QKD link
QBER (red symbols) as a function of optical receiver power and simulated QBER (red line). QBER error bars are one standard deviation. See
Methods for more details on the simulation. The dotted line shows the upper limit on the 100G pre-FEC error rate for error free operation after
error correction. c 100G pre-FEC error probability over 24 h corresponding to a receiver power of approximately −12 dBm
J.F. Dynes et al.
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QKD link becomes available again Fig. 3(b), section (iii), then the
network can react to this. In this case it will then start using the
CAPE-TREL OTP link to distribute the global keys while the TREL-
ENGI and CAPE-ENGI OTP activity goes quiet again.
Finally, we discuss the application layer, Fig. 4(a). As already
pointed out, we have installed two 100G encryptors at both CAPE
and TREL as an example application. This trafﬁc was added to the
network approximately halfway through the 1.6-year ﬁeld trial (see
blue arrow in Fig. 2(b)).The forward directed 100G trafﬁc from
these encryptors are wavelength multiplexed onto the same ﬁbre
as the QKD trafﬁc thus removing the need for a second dedicated
ﬁbre for QKD. This signiﬁcantly reduces deployment costs as a
dedicated ﬁbre is not required and QKD can integrate seamlessly
into conventional optical networks.
A potential downside of this approach is that the launch powers
of the classical data trafﬁc must be tailored to avoid deleterious
Raman scattering into the quantum channel around 1550 nm14
thereby circumventing increases in the Quantum Bit Error Rate
(QBER) due to this effect. However, as we show now, relatively
high-classical data trafﬁc optical receiver powers can be achieved
with minimal degradation of the QKD link. Figure 4(b) shows the
error rate before forward error correction (pre-FEC error rate) as a
function of the measured receiver power of a 100G line card. Note
a C-band EDFA is placed before the 100G optical receiver, see
Methods. Also shown is the measured and simulated QBER of the
QKD link over the same ﬁbre. As the optical receiver power
increases, the QBER increases marginally from 2.4% to 2.7% at the
highest receiver power of +4.7 dBm; thus the QKD link is barely
affected. At these receiver powers, the 100G pre-FEC error rate
saturates at ∼10−6. We choose to operate the 100G encryptors
using an optical receiver power of ~ −12dBm, corresponding to a
pre-FEC error rate ∼2 × 10−4, Fig. 4(c). This corresponds to a 5 dB
margin in the optical receiver power below the upper limit on the
100G pre-FEC error rate for error free operation (after error
correction). Such a margin was used to account for equipment
temperature effects and aging.46 Note optical communication
systems should operate with a post-FEC error rate of at least 10−12
but preferably 10−15.47 With our 100G optical transport system, a
post-FEC error rate of 10−15 is guaranteed with BERs below 1.9 ×
10−2 (dotted line in Fig. 4b).
We also checked the full network support in a conﬁguration
where 200 Gbps data trafﬁc was sent around the full ring of the
Cambridge metro network. In this case both pairs of 100G line
card encryptors were placed at CAPE. The forward directed trafﬁc
was directed CAPE-TREL-ENGI-CAPE over all three quantum links.
No performance degradation in the quantum layer was observed
over a 1 week operation period.
DISCUSSION
The Cambridge quantum network is a fully functional quantum
network operating over lit ﬁbre with Mbps quantum key
generation rates. These high key rates are compatible with
metropolitan architecture with tens of nodes. For OTP encryption
users can access much higher bandwidths than previously
reported—around three orders of magnitude improvement, Fig.
1(b). For AES encryption users can expect 100 Gbps data
bandwidths with ~1 Hz AES quantum key refresh rates—
operating in the same ﬁbre as QKD. The quantum key rates
reported here are sufﬁcient to support thousands of users, which
is sufﬁcient for most major cities. For example, in the overall three
layer network model,29 we might expect each node in the
Cambridge quantum network to support a number of quantum
access networks (QAN)48,49 serving the area in the city surround-
ing the node, Fig. 1(d). QANs have been proven to work with
aggregate bandwidths up to hundreds of kbps50 and, therefore,
several of these at each metro node would be highly suitable for
this metropolitan network. Consider a situation where each QAN
user communicates with just one other QAN user via the
Cambridge quantum network. The bandwidth per user on average
then scales (see Methods) as
B  2R=n (2)
where n is the total number of users per node. For a practical
bandwidth (or bit rate) per user (which can support AES key
exchange) of >100 bps, it can be seen from Fig. 1(e) that the
Cambridge quantum metro network, which displays QKD link
speeds of 2.5 Mbps can support around 100,000 users, which is
comparable to the population of Cambridge. Figure 1(e) shows
that larger populations in bigger cities, such as London, can also
be supported, albeit with lower data bandwidths. Hence our
results show that our quantum network design can work in the
vast majority of metropolitan environments.
METHODS
Quantum layer
Each QKD system consists of a 2U rack mountable unit. To maximise the
secure bit rate they run an efﬁcient version42 of the BB84 protocol with two
decoy states.41 The intensities of the signal states was 0.4 photons per
pulse, 0.1 photons per pulse for the strong decoy states and ~10−4
photons per pulse for the weak decoy states. These values were selected
based on a simulation of the QKD protocol, which would yield the highest
secure bit rate. Error correction is performed using a multithreaded version
of the Cascade protocol.51 Finite key size effects are minimised by using
large sifted block sizes of 100Mbit. The choice of a 100Mbits for the sifted
block size is given by examining the trade-off between efﬁciency and
speed of the privacy ampliﬁcation algorithm. In all, 100Mbits gives a
secure bit rate, which is >85% the asymptotic bit rate (in particular see
Fig. 2 in Lucamarini et al.42), so reasonably efﬁcient. At the same time the
speed of the algorithm for this block size is fast enough that it does not
provide a bottleneck to the QKD throughput. Privacy ampliﬁcation is
implemented with a number theoretic transform38 method in software
using the C programming language. The number theoretic transform
used52 is attractive since it gives an exact result with no round off error.
The security parameter for privacy ampliﬁcation was chosen to be 10−10.
This is a typical value used in QKD42 and represents a very conservative key
failure probability of 1 key every 30,000 years (for a secure bit rate of
1 Mbps and a block size of 100Mbits). Note this point-to-point security
parameter should be reduced by N(N–1)/2 depending on the number of
logical links in the network. For example if N= 100, the security parameter
should be reduced for the point-to-point links from 10−10 to of the order of
10−14. This ensures a 10−10 security parameter for the entire network.
Reducing the security parameter in this way decreases the secure bit rate
of the point-to-point QKD links by around a few percent. Thus, it has a
close to negligible effect on network performance. Phase encoding is
achieved by utilising polarisation maintaining ﬁbre-based asymmetric
Mach–Zehnder interferometers. Active feedback to maintain system
alignment is implemented with separate proportional/integral/derivative
(PID) control systems for phase, polarisation and temporal synchronisation.
Single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operating in self-differencing
mode are used in the QKD receiver for quantum channel signal recovery.
Room temperature operation enables high detection efﬁciencies of around
30%, as well as low afterpulsing (~3%).45
QKD classical channels are wavelength multiplexed onto the same ﬁbre
as the quantum channel and comprise synchronisation and reconciliation
channels. The total launch powers of these channels are around −12 dBm.
Note the reconciliation channels include a standard bi-directional 1G
Ethernet link that ran continuously for the 1.6-year ﬁeld trial. The launch
power dependent spontaneous Raman scattering powers can be obtained
from Eqs. (2), (3) in Eraerds et al.14 and then can be converted into detector
noise counts.
We simulated the effect on the QBER on varying the launch power of the
100G trafﬁc by using Eq. (4) in Patel et al.15 This considers contributions
from single photon detector dark counts, afterpulsing, as well as noise
counts from spontaneous Raman scattering.
Network key delivery Layer
The key delivery module, located at each node, comprises four distinct
sub-modules: quantum key collection and buffering, OTP key relay, global
J.F. Dynes et al.
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key management and application interface (API). We use an efﬁcient
software implementation of the key delivery module to cope with the
high-quantum key rates. The QKD systems push quantum keys when they
are generated to the key delivery modules using a secured link. These keys
are buffered locally in the key delivery module. Global keys are generated
locally using a random number generator and are routed to peer nodes via
OTP encryption of quantum keys using IP address-based tunnels and
buffered using the global key management sub-module. For key relaying
via intermediate nodes, the intermediate node determines the following
node by routing table lookup.40 The global key management sub-module
also keeps track of the number of global keys stored and calls upon the
OTP key relay sub-module to top-up the global keys as and when required.
Users connect to the key delivery module to request global keys for their
applications in a client-server manner using a REST-style API. This
encompasses a Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol
and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data format, which is simple,
lightweight, and widely used. Users are authenticated by a certiﬁcate-
based authentication scheme. The HTTPS and JSON protocols are only
used inside the trusted node between the key management and
application devices (e.g., the 100G encryption system) in the Cambridge
quantum network. None of these protocols are used outside trusted nodes.
Application layer
Two ADVA FSP3000 network communication chassis each containing two
CFP 100G encryption line cards were installed at CAPE and TREL sites. The
two CFP line cards employ dual polarisation quadrature phase shift keying
with coherent reception and soft decision FEC for data transmission and
were conﬁgured to emit at the DWDM wavelengths of 1530.33 nm and
1531.90 nm. The forward directed trafﬁc from these cards was multiplexed
together using a 48 channel DWDM multiplexer with nominal loss of 5 dB
before being sent over the same ﬁbre as the QKD link. The backward
directed trafﬁc was sent over a second ﬁbre. For quantum encryption, we
modiﬁed the line card ﬁrmware to accept external keys from the network
control unit (NCU) of each FSP3000 (in place of AES keys exchanged by
public key cryptography). The NCU of each FSP3000 was conﬁgured to
connect with the global key delivery module and request keys via the
global key delivery module API.
Bandwidth per logical link derivations
Here, we empirically derive Eq. (1), (2).
For Eq. (1), consider a ring network of N= 3 nodes. To connect each
node logically, i.e., with a single link connecting each node to each other,
the total number of logical links matches the number of physical links, i.e.:
3. For a fully meshed ring network of N= 4 the total number of logical links
is 6, whereas the number of physical links is 4. Now consider a ring
network of N= 5 nodes, as in Fig. 1(a). The network is fully meshed so the
number of logical links is 10 whereas the number of physical links is 5.
Therefore, for an arbitrary number of nodes, in a fully meshed network the
number of logical links scales with the number of nodes as: N N  1ð Þ=2.
Now for simplicity, we assume each of the physical links in the network
has the same QKD link secure bit rate, R. For three nodes N= 3, labelled A,
B and C, the two nodes A and B can distil keys in two ways: (1) directly
from A to B, with rate R; (2) through the third node C, again with rate R.
Therefore, logical link AB can distil a key at an effective rate of 2R by
concatenating the rates AB and ACB while at the same time the other
logical links AC and BC have zero secure bit rates (since they act as key
relays). So to ﬁnd the minimum average secure bit rate per logical link we
then divide this rate by the number of logical links 3, arriving at B  2R=3.
For four nodes N= 4, labelled A, B, C and D, the two nodes A and B can
again distil keys in two ways (1) directly from A to B, with rate R; (2)
through the third and fourth nodes C and D, again with rate R. Therefore,
logical link AB can distil a key at an effective rate of 2R by concatenating
the rates AB and ADCB while at the same time the other logical links AD,
DC and CB have zero secure bit rates. To ﬁnd the minimum average secure
bit rate per logical link we then divide this rate by the number of logical
links 6, arriving at B  2R6 ¼ R=3.
The argument above is provable for any number of nodes N thus
arriving at the formula in Eq. (1), namely: B  4R= N N  1ð Þ½ .
For Eq. (2), we consider only the case of three nodes connected in a
triangle as for the Cambridge quantum network, Fig. 1(d). For simplicity we
assume each of the three links in the network has the same QKD link
secure bit rate, R. We also assume the same number of users n are
connected to each of the three nodes. Therefore, there are a total of 3n
users in the network. Consider the case where there are just n= 4 users
per node. If each user communicates to exactly one other user via the
Cambridge quantum network, then on average two users will commu-
nicate across one QKD link with secure bit rate R. Then the bandwidth (or
bit rate) per user link scales as B  R=2 since ½ the total QKD link secure bit
rate will be shared between two users. Now consider the case where there
are n= 6 users per node. Again if each user communicates with exactly
one other user via the Cambridge quantum network, then on average
three users will communicate across one QKD link with secure bit rate R.
Then the bandwidth (or bit rate) per user link scales as B  R=3 since 1/3 of
the total QKD link secure bit rate will be shared between three users. It will
be seen the general rule for n users (per node) is that the bandwidth (or bit
rate) per user link scales as B  2R=n.
Trusted node architecture
Trusted node architectures in QKD are well established approaches to
building large scale networks and extending the reach of QKD. For
example in China, the QKD link between Bejing and Shanghai is based on a
trusted node architecture.53 Almost all QKD networks up to the current day
have been based on trusted node;6,8,9 however, the opportunities to build
secure QKD networks based on untrusted relays appears to be opening up
with ground to satellite QKD links54 as well as practical MDI-QKD34 and the
recent inception of twin-ﬁeld QKD,55 a more efﬁcient form of MDI-QKD,
which has also been experimentally demonstrated.56–58 We acknowledge
that while no node can be perfectly secure, in terms of “real-life security”
many network nodes in commercial environments are extremely well
secured typically requiring high-level authorisation to access. Furthermore,
network equipment is placed inside network nodes in lockable rack
cabinets.
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